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Abstract 
 
Retailers’ private standards are increasingly important in addressing consumer concerns 
about safety, quality and social and environmental issues. Empirical evidence shows that 
these private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts. I 
develop a political economy model that may contribute to explaining this stylized fact. I 
show that if producers exercise their political power to persuade the government to 
impose a lower public standard, retailers may apply their market power to install a private 
standard at a higher level than the public one. 
 
Keywords: Private Standards, Public Standards, Political Economy 
1. Introduction 
Private standards, introduced by private companies, are increasingly important in the 
global market system (Henson and Hooker 2001; Henson 2004; Fulponi 2007). Retailers 
and companies have a variety of motives to implement private standards. First, private 
standards may reduce consumers’ uncertainty and informational asymmetry about 
product characteristics (Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995; Kirchhoff 2000). Similarly, in a 
business to business environment, private standards allow to ensure and communicate 
product attributes which may facilitate firms to gear their activities to one another. 
Second, firms may use private standards as a strategic tool to create market 
segmentation by differentiating their products and softening competition (see e.g. Spence 
1976; Mussa and Rosen 1978; Tirole 1988). Several other authors have shown that in a 
vertically differentiated market a minimum quality standard imposed by the government 
(a public standard) may raise welfare, depending on the type of competition between 
producers (see e.g. Leland 1979; Ronnen 1991). 
Third, private standards may also serve to preempt government regulations (Lutz et al. 
2000). McCluskey and Winfree (2009) argue that by anticipating the standard-setting of 
governments in setting their own private standards firms may minimize the negative 
effect of standards on revenues. From a political economy perspective, Maxwell et al. 
(2000) argue that firms may strategically preempt costly political action through 
voluntary private standards. 
Finally, some authors argue that instead of introducing private standards, firms may 
favor the imposition of a public standard that applies to all firms, e.g. Salop and 
Scheffman (1983), Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2008; 2009; 2011), and Maloney and 
                                                 
1 I gratefully acknowledge useful comments from Jo Swinnen, Jo Reynaerts, and Mauro Vigani. This 
research was financially supported by Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO). 
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McCormick (1982). 
Importantly, empirical evidence shows that 80% to 90% of retailers assess their own 
private standards slightly or significantly higher than public standards. So far, to the best 
of my knowledge, only the competition-reducing vertical differentiation argument (i.e. 
the literature on minimum quality standards) and the model of Maxwell et al. (2000) may 
offer an explanation for this observation. The explanation proffered by the vertical 
differentiation literature is that those retailers who set their private standard at a higher 
level than the public minimum quality standard aim at differentiating themselves from 
other retailers that sell at the minimum quality standard, thus raising profits by reducing 
competition. However, this does not explain the high percentage of retailers assessing 
their own private standards as more stringent – one would expect a higher number of 
retailers assessing their private standards as being as stringent as the public ones. It 
neither explains the phenomenon that some private standards introduced by organizations 
such as the BRC (British Retail Consortium) are adopted by almost all European retailers. 
According to Maxwell et al. (2000), another potential explanation is that private 
standards may preempt public standards if the political costs of organizing consumers are 
sufficiently high. However, this model only explains why in some domains public 
standards may be lacking while private standards are imposed. 
This paper contributes to the literature by offering an additional explanation for the 
observed relationship between the level of retailers’ private standards and the 
government’s public standards. The argument is related to Maxwell et al. (2000) since the 
perspective taken in this paper is also a political-economic one. However, so far the 
literature has been concerned with producers’ private standards only, without analyzing 
retailers’ private standards. Therefore I explicitly introduce a third party retailer that may 
set a private standard to regulate the same product characteristics as the government’s 
public standard. The public standard is assumed to be determined in a political game 
where producers and the retailer have political power to influence the government’s 
standard-setting process, whereas the private standard is set unilaterally by the retailer. I 
show that a retailer may set its private standard at a higher level than the public standard 
if the retailer has sufficient market power to impose the larger share of the standards’ 
implementation costs on producers. My model thus combines both the retailer’s market 
power and producers’ political power to explain why a private retailer’s standard may be 
set at a higher level than the public standard, and demonstrates which other factors are 
likely to affect the relative stringency of the private versus the public standard. 
The paper is structured as follows. First I specify the different agents in my model, i.e. 
consumers, producers, and the retailer, and determine the market equilibrium for a given 
standard. Second, I analyze how a standard affects these different market players. Third, I 
analyze the level of the government’s public standard when the latter is determined in a 
political economy game where producers and the retailer contribute to the government to 
influence the public standard-setting process. Fourth, I determine the retailer’s optimal 
private standard in an environment where the retailer has market power to impose a 
private standard. Fifth, I compare the level of the retailer’s optimal private standard with 
the politically optimal public standard and show under which conditions the private 
standard is set at a higher level than the public one, and which factors influence these 
conditions.  
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2. The Model 
I assume that consumers are ex ante uncertain about the characteristics of the product (see 
also Leland 1979). Standards may thus improve upon the unregulated market equilibrium 
by providing information on the product’s credence characteristics (Nelson 1970; Darby 
and Karni 1973) and reducing the asymmetric information between consumers and 
producers. Similar to most studies, I assume that the introduction of a standard implies 
compliance costs for producers (see e.g. Leland 1979; Ronnen 1991). A novel feature of 
my model is the inclusion of an intermediary agent – a monopolist retailer. This retailer is 
able to set a private standard that regulates the same characteristics as the government’s 
public standard. I limit the analysis to a closed-economy model to refrain from potential 
barriers-to-trade issues. 
2.1. Consumers 
Consider a standard which guarantees certain quality/safety features of the product. Such 
a standard positively affects utility as it reduces or solves informational asymmetries. I 
assume a representative consumer utility function ( ),u x s  where x  is consumption of the 
good, and s  is the standard. A higher s  refers to a more stringent standard. Consumer 
utility is increasing and concave in both consumption ( )0; 0x xxu u> < 2 and the standard 
( )0; 0s ssu u> < . I further assume that 0xsu > , i.e. that a standard has a larger marginal 
impact on consumer utility if consumption is larger. The representative consumer 
maximizes consumer surplus CΠ  by choosing consumption x :  
 ( )max ,C
x
u x s px⎡ ⎤Π = −⎣ ⎦ , (1) 
where p  is the consumer price. The first order condition of this maximization problem is  
 0
C
xu px
∂Π = − =∂ . (2) 
Rewriting Equation (2) gives 
 ( ),xp u x s= , (3) 
which implicitly defines the inverse demand function ( ),p x s . The inverse demand 
function is downward sloping with 0x xxp u= < . For simplicity, xxsu  is assumed to be 
zero. Hence the reduced-form expression for consumer surplus is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,C x s u x s p x s xΠ = − . (4) 
2.2. Producers 
I assume that production is a function of a sector-specific input factor that is available in 
inelastic supply. All profits made in the sector accrue to the specific factor owners and 
producers are price-takers. I assume that a standard imposes some production constraints 
which increase production costs. To model this, I assume a representative producer with 
                                                 
2 In the remainder of the paper, subscripts denote partial derivatives to x  or s , and superscripts refer to 
consumers ( )C , producers ( )P , the retailer ( )R , social welfare ( )W , or the government ( )G . 
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cost function ( ),c x s  that depends on respectively output and the standard.3 The cost 
function is assumed to be increasing and convex both in production ( )0; 0x xxc c> >  and 
the standard ( )0; 0s ssc c> > . I further assume that 0xsc > , i.e. that a standard has a larger 
marginal impact on production costs for a larger output. Producers are price takers, 
maximizing their profits PΠ  by setting output x :  
 ( )max ,P
x
wx c x s⎡ ⎤Π = −⎣ ⎦ , (5) 
where w  is the producer price. The first order condition of this maximization problem is  
 0
P
xw cx
∂Π = − =∂ . (6) 
Rewriting Equation (6) gives 
 ( ),xw c x s= , (7) 
which implicitly defines the inverse supply function ( ),w x s . The inverse supply function 
is upward sloping with 0x xxw c= > . For simplicity, xxsc  is assumed to be zero. Hence the 
reduced-form expression for producer profits is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,P x s w x s x c x sΠ = − . (8) 
In the remainder of the analysis I assume that production costs are sufficiently convex 
and consumer utility sufficiently concave in s  to ensure global maxima. 
2.3. The Retailer and the Market Equilibrium 
I assume that output from producers is sold to consumers through only one intermediary 
agent – a monopolist retailer. Handling costs are normalized to zero. The retailer is a 
Stackelberg leader who sets consumer and producer prices such that, under optimal price-
taking behavior of consumers and producers, consumption and output equal at the level 
that maximizes the retailer’s profits, RΠ . Formally, the retailer’s profits are 
 ( ) ( )( )max , ,R
x
p x s w x s x⎡ ⎤Π = −⎣ ⎦ . (9) 
The first order condition of this problem is 
 ( ) 0R x xp w x p xx
∂Π = − + − =∂ , (10) 
and hence the equilibrium quantity ( )*x s , for a given level of the standard s , is 
 ( )* x x
xx xx
u cx s
c u
−= − ,  (11) 
where the asterisk sign denotes the market equilibrium. The reduced-form expressions for 
consumer surplus, producer profits, and retailer profits at market equilibrium can be 
written as respectively 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )* * *, ,C s u x s s p x s s x sΠ = − ; (12) 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* * *, ,P s w x s s x s c x s sΠ = − ; (13) 
                                                 
3 Since in equilibrium consumption equals output I use the same symbol x  for both output and 
consumption. 
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 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )* * *, ,R s p x s s w x s s x s⎡ ⎤Π = −⎣ ⎦ . (14) 
Social welfare, ( )W s , is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, producer profits, and 
retailer profits: 
 ( ) ( )j
j
W s s= Π∑ , with , ,j C P R= . (15) 
3. The Impact of a Standard 
Before determining the optimal public and private standards, I analyze the impact of a 
marginal change in the standard on the market equilibrium, the interests of the market 
players, and social welfare. Consider first the supply and demand effects. The impact of a 
marginal change in the standard on the inverse supply function, ( )( )* ,w x s s , is  
 *s xs s xxw c x c= + ,  (16) 
where the first term on the right hand side is the direct marginal impact on the inverse 
supply and the second term is the marginal change in the equilibrium quantity multiplied 
by the slope of the inverse supply function. The impact on the inverse demand function, 
( )( )* ,p x s s , of a marginal change in the standard is  
 *s xs s xxp u x u= + , (17) 
where the first term on the right hand side represents the standard’s direct marginal 
impact on the inverse demand and the second term is the marginal change in the 
equilibrium quantity multiplied by the slope of the inverse demand function. The impact 
of a marginal change in the standard on the equilibrium quantity, ( )*x s , is 
 * 1
2
xs xs
s
xx xx
u cx
c u
−= − . (18) 
The denominator of Equation (18) is always positive because production costs are convex 
and consumer utility is concave in x . However, the sign of the numerator is 
undetermined since the direct marginal impacts on the inverse supply and demand 
function, xsc  and xsu , are both positive. Therefore the equilibrium quantity increases with 
a more stringent standard if the direct demand effect, xsu , is larger than the direct impact 
on supply, xsc ; and vice versa. 
Second, consider the marginal impact of a change in the standard on the different 
market players’ interests. By the envelope theorem, the marginal change in consumer 
surplus, ( )C sΠ , is 
 ( ) ( )( )* *C s xx s xss u x s u x us∂Π = − +∂ . (19) 
The marginal change in consumer surplus consists of the efficiency gain, i.e. the positive 
marginal utility impact, su , minus the marginal change in consumption expenditure, 
( )( )* *xx s xsx s u x u+ . The sign of the latter term is undetermined, so consumer utility may 
either increase or decrease with an increasing standard. The second part of the marginal 
change in consumption expenditure, ( )* xsx s u , is the rent-redistribution from consumers 
to the retailer. 
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By the envelope theorem, the marginal change in producer profits, ( )P sΠ , is 
 
( ) ( )( )* *P xx s xs ss x s c x c cs∂Π = + −∂ , (20) 
where the first term is the marginal change in producer revenue and the second term is 
the implementation cost, i.e. the direct marginal cost increase. The sign of the former is 
undetermined, so producer profits may increase or decrease with a change of the 
standard. The second part of the marginal change in producer revenues, ( )* xsx s c , is the 
rent-redistribution from the retailer to the producers. 
The marginal change in the retailer’s profits, ( )R sΠ , is 
 ( ) ( )( )*R xs xss x s u cs
∂Π = −∂ . (21) 
The first term, ( )* xsx s u , is the marginal increase in the retailer’s revenues and equals the 
rent-redistribution from consumers to the retailer. The second term, ( )* xsx s c , is the 
marginal increase in the retailer’s expenditures and equals the rent-redistribution from the 
retailer to the producers. The retailer’s profits thus increase if the rent-redistribution from 
consumers is larger than the rent-redistribution to producers; and vice versa. The second 
factor in Equation (21) is the same as the numerator of Equation (18), and therefore *sx  
has the same sign as ( )R s
s
∂Π
∂ . Hence if the equilibrium quantity increases ( )* 0sx > , the 
rent-redistribution from consumers to the retailer is larger than the rent-redistribution 
from the retailer to the producers, and the retailer’s profits increase with an increase in 
the standard. 
Deriving the marginal impact of the standard on social welfare, ( )W s , gives 
 ( ) ( ) ( )* *s s s xx xxW s u c x s x c us
∂ = − + −∂ . (22) 
The marginal change in social welfare equals the direct welfare effects, i.e. the efficiency 
gain su  minus the implementation cost sc , plus a term that is positive when the 
equilibrium quantity increases ( )* 0sx > . Therefore social welfare may increase or 
decrease, depending on the relative size of these factors. It is instructive to rewrite the 
third term in Equation (22): 
 
( ) ( ) ( )*
2s s xs xs
W s x s
u c u c
s
∂ = − + −∂ . (23) 
This shows that the third term is only positive if the marginal impact on the retailer’s 
revenues is positive (see Equation (21)).  
A first key result is that all market players may gain or lose from a change in the 
standard, and that this change involves rent-redistribution between the different market 
players. Likewise, social welfare may either increase or decrease with a change in the 
standard, depending on the relative size of the efficiency gain, implementation cost, and 
rent-redistributions. Hence, a political-economic analysis is desirable. 
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4. The Politically Optimal Public Standard 
In this section I build on the political economy model of public standards by Swinnen and 
Vandemoortele (2011) to analyze a government’s optimal standard-setting. Consider a 
government that maximizes its own objective function which, following the approach of 
Grossman and Helpman (1994), consists of a weighted sum of contributions from interest 
groups and social welfare. I restrict the set of policies available to politicians and only 
allow them to implement a public standard s . I assume that both the producers and 
retailer are politically organized into separate interest groups that lobby simultaneously. 
The ‘truthful’4 contribution schedules of the producers and retailer are of the form 
( ) ( ){ }max 0,k k kC s s b= Π −  with ,k P R= . kb  is a constant, a minimum level of profits 
the interest groups do not wish to spend on lobbying. The government’s objective 
function, ( )G sΠ , is a weighted sum of the interest group contributions, weighted by kα , 
and social welfare, where kα  represents the relative lobbying strength of the interest 
groups: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )G k k
k
s C s W sαΠ = +∑ . (24) 
The government chooses the level of the public standard to maximize its objective 
function. The politically optimal public standard, Gs , is therefore determined by the 
following first order condition, subject to 0Gs ≥ : 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
* * *
*
0.
2
P G R G
xx s xs s xs xs
G
s s xs xs
x s c x c c x s u c
x s
u c u c
α α⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+ − + − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (25) 
5. The Optimal Private Standard 
I assume that the retailer may set a private standard that regulates the same product 
characteristics as the public standard. Since the monopolist retailer is the only 
intermediary agent between producers and consumers, producers must comply with the 
retailer’s private standard. The retailer maximizes profits by setting a private standard, 
given the market equilibrium in Equation (11) that takes into account the retailer’s own 
optimal price-setting behavior and the consumers’ and producers’ optimal price-taking 
behavior. Hence the retailer maximizes profits by setting both the equilibrium quantity 
and the private standard. Formally, the retailer maximizes its reduced-form profit 
function in Equation (14), and the optimal private standard, Rs , is determined by the 
following first order condition, subject to 0Rs ≥ : 
 ( )( )* 0R xs xsx s u c− = . (26) 
First order condition (26) shows that ( ) ( )* *R Rxs xsu x s c x s=  at Rs . Condition (26) implies 
that the rent-redistribution from consumers to the retailer equals the rent-redistribution 
                                                 
4 The common-agency literature (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston 1986) states that a truthful contribution 
schedule reflects the true preferences of the interest group. In our model this implies that lobby groups set 
their lobbying contributions in accordance with their expected profits and how these are marginally affected 
by the standard.  
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from the retailer to producers at Rs .  
Before I turn to comparing the optimal public and private standards, it is instructive to 
analyze the marginal impact of the retailer’s optimal private standard on consumer 
surplus, producer profits, and social welfare. At Rs , the marginal impact of the standard 
on consumer surplus is 
 ( ) ( )*
R
C
R
s xs
s s
s
u x s u
s =
∂Π = −∂ , (27) 
which equals the efficiency gain minus the rent-redistribution to the retailer and may be 
positive or negative. Similarly, the marginal impact of the standard on producer profits at 
Rs  is 
 ( ) ( )*
R
P
R
xs s
s s
s
x s c c
s =
∂Π = −∂ , (28) 
which equals the rent-redistribution from the retailer to the producers minus the 
implementation costs. The sign of expression (28) is also undetermined. From Equation 
(23) it follows that at Rs  the marginal impact of a standard on social welfare is 
 
( )
R
s s
s s
W s
u c
s =
∂ = −∂ , (29) 
which may be positive or negative depending on the relative size of the efficiency gain 
and the implementation cost.  
These marginal impacts demonstrate that only under very specific circumstances the 
interests of consumers and producers coincide with the retailer’s interest. Only if 
Equations (27) and (28) simultaneously equal zero at Rs , the interests of consumers, 
producers, and the retailer coincide. In that specific case, social welfare and the 
government’s objective function are also maximal at Rs .  
6. The Optimal Private Standard versus the Optimal Public Standard 
I now compare the optimal private standard, as preferred by the retailer, to the optimal 
public standard set by the government. Since production costs are sufficiently convex and 
consumer utility sufficiently concave in s  to ensure that both GΠ  and RΠ  are concave in 
s , it suffices to determine the sign of the standard’s marginal impact on the government’s 
objective function at Rs , ( )
R
G
s s
s
s =
∂Π
∂ , to evaluate how 
Gs  and Rs  compare. Specifically, 
if ( ) 0
R
G
s s
s
s =
∂Π >∂  then 
R Gs s< , and vice versa.  
Inserting into Equation (25) the results of Equation (26) that xs xsu c=  and * 0sx =  at 
Rs , the expression for the standard’s marginal impact on the government’s objective 
function at Rs  is 
 ( ) ( )*
R
G
P R
s s xs s
s s
s
u c x s c c
s
α
=
∂Π ⎡ ⎤= − + −⎣ ⎦∂ , (30) 
which may be positive or negative. Hence, a priori, it is not determined which of the two 
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standards is more stringent.  
I focus on the case where Equation (30) is negative. This allows unveiling the factors 
that contribute to private standards being more stringent than public ones, i.e. R Gs s> . 
Naturally, these same factors – in opposite direction – lead to the reverse situation where 
the preferred private standard is less stringent, R Gs s< . This situation is less relevant 
since a private standard is redundant if less stringent than the public standard. 
The standard’s marginal impact on the government’s objective function at Rs  can be 
divided into three parts: 
 ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
?
*
31 2
R
G
P R
s s xs s
s s
s
u c x s c c
s
α
=
⎡ ⎤∂Π ⎢ ⎥= − + −⎢ ⎥∂ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
??? ????? . (31) 
The first part equals the marginal social welfare effect of the standard at Rs  (see Equation 
(29)), and may be positive or negative. The second part is the rent-redistribution from the 
retailer to producers, and the third part is the standard’s implementation cost. These last 
two terms are weighted by the political power of the producers’ interest group, and 
together they represent the standard’s marginal impact on producer profits at Rs  (see 
Equation (28)) which may be positive or negative as well.  
The private standard is more stringent than the public one, R Gs s> , if and only if 
Equation (31) is negative, or equivalently, if 
 ( ) ( )
R R
P
P
s s s s
W s s
s s
α
= =
∂ ∂Π< −∂ ∂ . (32) 
Since both sides of Equation (32) can be either positive or negative, Equation (32) may 
hold under three different combinations: (i) the left hand side is negative while the right 
hand side is positive; (ii) both sides are positive; and (iii) both sides are negative. I first 
present these cases and then turn to the key factors that cause these combinations to 
occur. 
Case (i) 
First, consider the combination where the left hand side of Equation (32) is negative and 
the right hand side is positive, i.e. 
( )
0
Rs s
W s
s =
∂ <∂  and 
( ) 0
R
P
s s
s
s =
∂Π <∂ . Equation (32) 
then unambiguously holds, and R Gs s> . The fact that social welfare is marginally 
decreasing in the standard at Rs  shows that the retailer’s optimal private standard is 
higher than the socially optimal one, R Ws s> . Additionally, at Rs , producers’ profits are 
also marginally decreasing in which, according to Equation (28), implies that the 
compensating rent-redistribution from the retailer to the producers is not sufficient to 
offset the implementation cost born by the producers. Hence producers also favor a 
public standard that is lower than the retailer’s optimal private standard. 
The combination of these two factors explains why the government sets the optimal 
public standard at a lower level than what is preferred by the retailer, i.e. the optimal 
private standard. First, social welfare is higher under a standard that is lower than the 
private standard, and second, the government attracts larger contributions from the 
producers’ interest group since producers have higher profits when the standard is lower 
 - 10 - 
than the optimal private one. 
Case (ii) 
In the second case, both the left and right hand side of Equation (32) are positive. This 
implies that social welfare is marginally increasing at Rs  ( ) 0
Rs s
W s
s =
⎛ ⎞∂ >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
 such that 
W Rs s> , but that the compensating rent-redistribution from the retailer to the producers 
does not cover the implementation cost at Rs  ( ) 0
R
P
s s
s
s =
⎛ ⎞∂Π⎜ ⎟<⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
. Under this 
combination, Equation (32) only holds ( )R Gs s>  when the political power of the 
producers’ interest group, Pα , is sufficiently large.  
Since producer profits are marginally decreasing at Rs , producers lobby in favor of a 
public standard that is lower than the optimal private one. If their political power is 
sufficiently strong, the producers’ interest group successfully lobbies the government to 
set a lower public standard. Because producer lobbying prevents the imposition of a 
higher public standard, the retailer unilaterally sets its own private standard at a higher 
level than the politically optimal one. 
Case (iii) 
Both sides of Equation (32) are negative, i.e. 
( )
0
Rs s
W s
s =
∂ <∂  and 
( ) 0
R
P
s s
s
s =
∂Π >∂ , and 
social welfare is marginally decreasing and producer profits marginally increasing at Rs . 
The former marginal effect shows that R Ws s> , while the latter marginal effect implies 
that the compensating rent-redistribution from the retailer to the producers more than 
compensates the implementation cost at Rs , and that producers lobby in favor of a public 
standard that is higher than the optimal private one.  
However, Equation (32) only holds under this combination if Pα  is sufficiently 
small. In this case, producers benefit from and lobby in favor of a public standard that is 
higher than the optimal private one, but the producers’ interest group lacks the political 
power to successfully lobby the government. The retailer then unilaterally sets a private 
standard that is higher than the optimal public standard, although the latter is closer to the 
social optimum. 
Key Factors 
First, the size of the efficiency gain matters. If su  is smaller, then 
( )
Rs s
W s
s =
∂
∂  is more 
negative (first and third case) or less positive (second case). With a lower efficiency gain, 
Equation (32) is more likely to be negative such that R Gs s>  for a larger range of cost 
parameter values and producers’ political power. A lower efficiency gain induces the 
government to set a lower public standard because of social welfare considerations. The 
retailer does not take direct welfare effects into account so that the optimal private 
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standard is unaffected by a change in su . 
Second, the size of the implementation cost is also an important factor since it affects 
both social welfare and producer profits. If sc  is larger, then 
( )
Rs s
W s
s =
∂
∂  is more negative 
(first and third case) or less positive (second case). Additionally, ( )
R
P
s s
s
s =
∂Π
∂  is more 
negative (first and second case) or less positive (third case). Hence Equation (32) is more 
likely to be negative with a higher implementation cost, such that R Gs s>  for a larger 
range of other parameter values. A higher implementation cost causes the government to 
set a lower public standard, not only because of social welfare considerations but also 
because the producers’ interest group lobbies in favor of a lower public standard.  
Third, the rent-redistribution from the retailer to the producers plays an important role. 
If either xsc  or ( )* Rx s  is smaller, the marginal transfer from the retailer to the producers 
is smaller and ( )
R
P
s s
s
s =
∂Π
∂  is more negative (first and second case) or less positive (third 
case). In all cases the range of other parameter values for which Equation (32) is negative 
increases as the producers’ interest group lobbies in favor of a lower public standard. 
Since xsc  measures how much the retailer compensates the producers at a given level of 
the equilibrium output, xsc  can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the retailer’s 
market power. With a larger market power of the retailer, Equation (32) is more likely to 
be negative so that R Gs s> . 
Fourth, when producers’ interests are opposite to those of the retailer, i.e. when 
( ) 0
R
P
s s
s
s =
∂Π <∂  as in the first two cases, a larger political power of the producers’ 
interest group, Pα , leads to a lower public standard, and the range for which Equation 
(32) is negative and R Gs s>  increases.  
7. Conclusions 
It is well documented that retailers’ private standards are increasingly important in the 
global economy. Frequently empirical evidence shows that these private standards are 
more stringent than their public counterparts. Several explanations have been offered to 
explain this stylized fact, and in this paper I add another potential explanation by taking a 
political-economic perspective. 
In the model, I first show that all market players – consumers, producers, and the 
retailer – may gain or lose from a change in the standard, and that this change involves 
rent-redistribution between the different market players. Likewise, social welfare may 
either increase or decrease with a change in the standard, depending on the relative size 
of the efficiency gain, implementation cost, and rent-redistributions.  
Second, based on the optimality conditions for the public and private standard, I show 
that only in a very specific situation the retailer’s optimal private standard is also optimal 
from both the consumers’ and producers’ perspective, and hence socially and politically 
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optimal as well. In any other case, the market players’ interests differ. 
Third, by comparing the retailer’s optimal private standard to the politically optimal 
public standard, I show that several factors may cause the private standard to be more 
stringent than the public one. I demonstrate that a retailer is more likely to set a more 
stringent private standard when (a) the standard creates a small efficiency gain for 
consumers; (b) the implementation cost for producers is large; and (c) when the retailer 
has a strong market power vis-à-vis producers so that the rent-redistribution from the 
retailer to producers is small and producers bear the larger share of the implementation 
cost. Additionally, a higher political power of the producers’ interest group – and thus 
stronger lobbying – reinforces these factors if producers’ interests are opposite to those of 
the retailer. Hence producers may use their political power to obtain lower public 
standards while retailers may use their market power to set higher private standards. In 
combination these factors contribute to explaining why private standards are frequently 
more stringent than their public counterparts. 
 
References 
Arora, S. and Gangopadhyay, S. (1995). ‘Toward a Theoretical Model of Voluntary Overcompliance’. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 28: 289-309. 
Fulponi, L. (2007). ‘The Globalization of Private Standards and the Agri-Food System’. In Swinnen, J.F.M. 
(ed.) Global Supply Chains, Standards, and the Poor, CABI publications: 19-25. 
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (1994). ‘Protection for Sale’. American Economic Review, 84/4: 833-
850. 
Henson, S.J. (2004). ‘National Laws, Regulations, and Institutional Capabilities for Standards 
Development’. Paper presented at World Bank training seminar on Standards and Trade, Washington 
DC, 2004. 
Henson, S.J. and Hooker, N.H. (2001). ‘Private Sector Management of Food Safety: Public Regulation and 
the Role of Private Controls’. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 4: 7-17.  
Kirchhoff, S. (2000). ‘Green Business and Blue Angels: A Model of Voluntary Overcompliance with 
Asymmetric Information’. Environmental and Resource Economics, 15: 403-420. 
Leland, H.E. (1979). ‘Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards’. Journal 
of Political Economy, 87/6: 1328-1346. 
Lutz, S., Lyon T.P. and Maxwell, J.W. (2000). ‘Quality Leadership when Regulatory Standards are 
Forthcoming’. Journal of Industrial Economics, 48: 331-348. 
Maloney, M.T. and McCormick, R.E. (1982). ‘A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation’. 
Journal of Law and Economics, 25: 99-123. 
Maxwell, J.W., Lyon, T.P. and Hackett, S.C. (2000). ‘Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political 
Economy of Corporate Environmentalism’. Journal of Law and Economics, 43: 583-617. 
McCluskey, J.J. and Winfree, J.A. (2009). ‘Pre-Empting Public Regulation with Private Food Quality 
Standards’, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 36/4: 525-539. 
Mussa, M. and Rosen, S. (1978). ‘Monopoly and Product Quality’. Journal of Economic Theory, 18: 301-
317. 
Ronnen, U. (1991). ‘Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition’. RAND Journal of 
Economics, 22/4: 490-504. 
Salop, S.C. and Scheffman, D.T. (1983). ‘Raising Rivals’ Costs’. American Economic Review, 73: 267-
271. 
Spence, M. (1976). ‘Product Differentiation and Welfare’. American Economic Review, 66: 407-414. 
Swinnen, J.F.M. and Vandemoortele, T. (2008). ‘The Political Economy of Nutrition and Health Standards 
in Food Markets’. Review of Agricultural Economics, 30/3: 460-468. 
Swinnen, J.F.M. and Vandemoortele, T. (2009). ‘Are Food Safety Standards Different from Other Food 
Standards? A Political Economy Perspective’. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 36/4: 507-
523. 
Swinnen, J.F.M. and Vandemoortele, T. (2011). ‘Trade and the Political Economy of Public Standards’. 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, forthcoming. 
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
